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Police-on-police encounters, also referred to as Blue-on-Blue, are serious occurrences 
that can compromise investigations, cause physical injuries, or worse—result in death to 
officers, informants and/or innocent bystanders. Law enforcement deconfliction is the 
protocol that was developed to address this specific issue. This research focuses on the 
scope and breadth of federal law enforcement deconfliction processes within the United 
States. An examination of these processes uncovered complex organizational issues and 
human factors that undermine complete and consistent reporting of both failed and 
successful deconfliction events.  With national oversight and accountability, however, 
gaps and vulnerabilities in deconfliction operations could be addressed, and a repository 
to archive and evaluate these efforts could be formed. This thesis proposes that the Blue 
Diamond Deconfliction Division (BD3) should be established within the United States 
Attorney’s Office to provide deconfliction oversight and reporting, reduce federal law 
enforcement organizational and fiscal inefficiencies, and most importantly, save lives. 
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The nation’s law enforcement enterprise consists of approximately 706,886 full-time 
sworn police officers, and all are trained to respond quickly in tactical situations that 
sometimes have life-death outcomes.1  In 2008, the United States federal government had 
73 agencies with a cadre of approximately 120,000 sworn law enforcement officers.2  
During these fast-paced operations, the potential always exists for dangerous friendly fire 
police-on-police encounters. 
Police-on-police encounters, also referred to as Blue-on-Blue, are serious 
occurrences  that could result in compromising investigations, causing physical injuries 
or worse—resulting in death to officers, informants and/or innocent bystanders.  Law 
enforcement deconfliction is the protocol that was developed to address this specific 
issue.  This research focuses on the scope and breadth of federal law enforcement 
deconfliction processes within the United States.  
Throughout this thesis, deconfliction is defined as a policy, a culture and a 
systemic framework designed and developed in the context of law enforcement activities 
to: 
1. Enhance officer safety by preventing officers from separate agencies from 
unknowingly converging and confronting each other during law 
enforcement actions.3   
2. Decrease the risk of an investigation being compromised4 
3. Maximize the use of law enforcement resources by reducing the 
duplication of effort5  
                                                 
1 “Full-Time Law Enforcement Employees, Table 74—Crime in the United States 2009.” U.S. 
Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed March 24, 2014. 
http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/data/table_74.html. 
2  “Federal Law Enforcement Officers, 2008,” Bureau of Justice Statistics, accessed March 9, 2013, 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fleo08.pdf.  
3 “Chicago HIDTA Deconfliction Submissions.” Special Order SO4- 19–04. Chicago Police 
Department, accessed November 20, 2012, http:// 
http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-12a76ce1-24512-a776-
81a0a43f293fcb18.html. 
4 “Chicago HIDTA Deconfliction,” Chicago Police. 
.5Ibid. 
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4. Enhance officer safety, reduce risk and liability, safeguard citizens, ensure 
case integrity, strengthen information sharing, connect cases and suspects, 
and build public confidence.6  
An examination of the contributors to effective deconfliction processes uncovered 
complex organizational issues along with human factors that lead to incomplete and 
inconsistent reporting of both failed and successful deconfliction events. 
The objective of this thesis is to introduce protocols to form a systemic network, 
culture and paradigm to add precision and accountability to national deconfliction 
programs and events.  The research in this thesis focused on the scope and breadth of 
federal law enforcement deconfliction processes within the United States, which 
currently, and with dangerous potential, do not represent an effective, integrated and 
holistic system.  
With national oversight and accountability, however, gaps and vulnerabilities in 
deconfliction operations could be addressed, and a repository to archive and evaluate 
these efforts could be formed.   
Establishment and support for a pilot concept in the southwest border offices of 
the United States Attorney’s Offices, which this thesis calls the Blue Diamond 
Deconfliction Division (BD3), would provide national deconfliction oversight and 
reporting, reduce federal law enforcement organizational and fiscal inefficiencies and 
most importantly, save lives. The next steps for designing and implementing a BD3 are to 
take the recommendations of this thesis, establish the pilot BD3, formalize deconfliction 
practices throughout federal law enforcement agencies and build the national data 
repository of deconfliction events to identify concerns and/or smart practices. 
The results of this thesis conclude that the imperative steps to a national 
deconfliction framework.  These imperative steps are: 
1. To identify redundancies and/overlap in federal law enforcement 
investigations through oversight and accountability of their deconfliction 
practices 
                                                 
6 “Event Deconfliction Systems,” National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center, accessed February 
21, 2014, https://www.ncirc.gov/Documents/event_deconfliction_call_to_action.pdf. 
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2. To strengthen information sharing through trust building practices 
3. To formalize the United States Attorney’s Office authoritative role in 
deconfliction by establishing a BD3 concept within its districts. 
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I. THE PROBLEM SPACE 
A. INTRODUCTION—LAW ENFORCEMENT DECONFLICTION 
Multiple weapons are pointed at you. Everyone is yelling, “Stop, Police!” because 
all of them are the police. How can this happen in the 21st century, with all the available 
communications and technologies?  Because airtight interagency deconfliction1 processes 
are lacking and far from foolproof. Law enforcement officers in uniform can quickly 
identify each other. Undercover officers and law enforcement confidential informants’ 
(CI) identities are concealed for obvious reasons in order to protect them and the 
investigations. Departments and agencies have formal and informal processes to avoid 
police-on-police encounters. These processes appear to vary by system used and level of 
compliance. This thesis will examine this compelling deconfliction issue, which has 
everything to do with both the public’s safety and the force protection of law enforcement 
officers. 
What is deconfliction designed to do in the context of law enforcement activities? 
1. Enhance officer safety by preventing officers from separate agencies from 
unknowingly converging and confronting each other during law 
enforcement actions. 
2.  Decrease the risk of an investigation being compromised. 
3.  Maximize the use of law enforcement resources by reducing the 
duplication of effort.2  
Law enforcement deconfliction is expected to enhance officer safety, reduce risk 
and liability, safeguard citizens, ensure case integrity, strengthen information sharing, 
connect cases and suspects, and build public confidence.3 
                                                 
1 The term deconfliction is accepted vernacular within law enforcement and military organizations as a 
process to avoid police-on-police, friendly fire and or duplicative actions. 
2 “Chicago HIDTA Deconfliction Submissions.” Special Order SO4- 19–04. Chicago Police 
Department, accessed November 20, 2012, http:// 
http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-12a76ce1-24512-a776-
81a0a43f293fcb18.html. 
3 “Event Deconfliction Systems,” National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center, accessed February 
21, 2014, https://www.ncirc.gov/Documents/event_deconfliction_call_to_action.pdf. 
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Law enforcement officers and special agents operate within territorial areas. 
Officers enforce laws in their districts, counties, states or federal jurisdictions or 
boundaries. Not only are there jurisdictional borders to enforcement, there may be 
exclusive criminal statutes or authorities that other agencies cannot enforce. Law 
enforcement task forces are created to bring those authorities together to maximize 
interagency enforcement goals. Agencies that participate in a task force or collaborative 
approach must clearly define their roles and responsibilities and clearly understand other 
agencies’ roles, responsibilities, resources, and missions.4  
The movement to use joint investigations and embed agents/officers from other 
departments is designed to maximize resources, build partnerships, cross jurisdictions, 
and provide a deconfliction process to target criminal organizations. Deconfliction is not 
only used to keep two or more agencies from expending resources on the same criminal 
organization without knowing it, but also to provide a safety net for alerting law 
enforcement agencies that they may be encountering another law enforcement agency 
during an undercover  or operational event.  
B. DECONFLICTION REAL SCENARIO VIGNETTE 
1. Who Are the Good Guys and Who Are the Bad Guys? 
A federal agency (we will call Agency Alpha) lawfully obtains cellular phone 
data from a target of investigation. The target offered to sell Agency Alpha’s undercover 
assets a variety of rifles along with grenades and a .50-caliber rifle. The criminal target 
was informed of the proposed intent to transport these items into Mexico. This is a 
federal export crime. Agency Alpha ran the cellular numbers through their protocol 
deconfliction systems. In addition, Agency Alpha conducts checks with local High 
Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) and even makes informal calls in an effort to 
fully deconflict this investigation. No conflicts are reported. With the support of the 
United States Attorney’s Office, Agency Alpha expects to pursue a court ordered wire 
intercept on the firearm vendor to determine the source of the weapons. An official 
                                                 
4 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Combating Gangs: Better Coordination and Performance 
Measurement Would Help Clarify Roles of Federal Agencies and Strengthen Assessment of Efforts, GAO-
09-708 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2009), 67–68. 
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request is made for the $50,000 needed to purchase the large variety of weapons. 
Additional requests are made to allow Agency Alpha’s agents to “walk”5 the money. 
Agency Alpha’s intent is to take their newly purchased weapons and leave. After 
conducting the wire intercept and gathering more evidence regarding the organization, 
Agency Alpha expected to arrest the target and his conspirators.   
It was not that simple. For only the due diligence and tenaciousness of an Agency 
Alpha’s group supervisor, a possible lethal situation was averted. The supervisor, while 
reviewing the cellular phone records, recognized a number that he knew belonged to 
another federal agency (Agency Bravo). After a few calls, it was clear that Agency 
Alpha’s target was actually an asset for Agency Bravo. All of the investigative hours 
were wasted. The Agency Alpha supervisor attempted to uncover how this near police-
on-police encounter had occurred. The supervisor was confused. He had conducted the 
deconfliction and all were negative. The response given to the supervisor by Agency 
Bravo’s representative was that he would not have learned of their involvement at the 
time. It is clear that Agency Bravo had not submitted their asset’s cellular phone numbers 
into established deconfliction systems in order to avoid such situations.   
The gravity of the situation is that Agency Alpha expected to walk away with 
their weapons from a suspected criminal after the money was exchanged. Agency Bravo 
could not allow anyone to take custody of the “flash”6 of weapons. After receipt of the 
currency, Agency Bravo would have executed arrest procedures. Unfortunately, not 
knowing the firearm vendor was actually not a bad guy, but a good guy, Agency Alpha, 
would have presumed they were being “ripped.”7   
It is not a difficult jump to see the potential for injury and/or death. This is a bad 
recipe. Due to the volume of weapons involved in this law enforcement operation, it 
could be possible that the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT)/Special Response Team 
                                                 
5 In this context, the term “walk” identifies an enforcement tool that allows law enforcement 
officers/agents to pay for contraband knowing that the currency may not ever be recovered. 
6 In this context, the term “flash” represents the showing of items to potential buyers without intent to 
actually exchange such items. 
7 In this context, the term “ripped” refers to being ripped off (i.e., stolen from). 
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(SRT) teams would be called to execute or support the arrest. There would be an arsenal 
of weapons involved in this encounter/ situation. 
Maybe, if this had been the first near encounter, it could have been chalked up as 
a fluke. But, it was not. Agency Bravo had been involved in another deconfliction issue 
months earlier, again involving weapons trafficking. When Agency Alpha management 
met with Agency Bravo command leadership, it was made clear that all Agency Alpha 
needed to do was to use the established deconfliction systems. These systems are 
Deconfliction Internet Connectivity Endeavor (DICE) and the event deconfliction 
systems of the local High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA). For both events, 
Agency Alpha had done exactly that. 
How could two federal agencies in the same geographic area with deconfliction 
processes, systems, and professional relationships be this close to arriving at an 
undercover meet that could have ended up so very badly?   
C. METRICS 
Currently, there are several formal and informal systems or procedures for event 
and case/target deconfliction. These are examples of the formal systems that will be 
discussed in this thesis:  Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) Officer Safety 
Event Deconfliction System (RISSafe), High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) 
Case Explorer and Secure Automated Fast Event Tracking Network (SAFENet), De-
confliction Internet Connectivity Endeavor (DICE) and Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) Guardian program. Other deconfliction entities are the El Paso Intelligence Center 
(EPIC), State Fusion Centers, and Intelligence divisions.   
This thesis will identify several systems that provide event and/or case/target 
deconfliction. Event deconfliction is a process of determining when law enforcement 
personnel are conducting an event in close proximity to one another at the same time.8  
An example of event deconfliction is the execution of a search/arrest warrant, 
surveillance activity and/or an undercover operation. 
                                                 
8 “Event Deconfliction Systems,” National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center. 
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Case/target deconfliction is the process of determining if different law 
enforcement personnel are investigating the same individuals or organizations. 
Detailed statistics relating to DICE are marked For Official Use Only (FOUO) 
and/or Law Enforcement Sensitive (LES) and were not included in this thesis. In 2013, 
the Program Manager-Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE) published its annual 
report to Congress. In this  PM-ISE 2013 Report, DICE was mentioned as being deploy 
in November 2009 and is described as a “software tool that enables HIDTA, federal, 
state, and local law enforcement with enhanced investigative efficiencies though ability 
to deconflict information, such as phone numbers, email addresses, license plates and 
financial account information over a secure Internet browser.”9  PM-ISE’s 2013 Annual 
Report announced that between January 2013 and June 2013, there were 62,657 
operations entered into the interface between RISSafe and Case Explorer.10  Conflicts 
were found to have occurred in 25,054 of those operational requests.11  No elaboration on 
the level of conflict was noted. There was also a recommendation to complete case and 
event deconfliction interoperability by fiscal year (FY) 2014.12 
The Regional Information Sharing System initiated its RISSafe operation/event 
Deconfliction program in the summer of 2008. In November 2013, RISS announced its 
750,000thth operation entered into RISSafe.13  RISS announced that more than 260,600 
conflicts had been identified to date, which represented a 35% of all operations entered.14  
RISS calculated those findings to report that 7 of every 20 operations entered into 
RISSafe conflicted with other entries, which could have resulted, if not identified, in near 
                                                 
9 “Section 3: Optimizing Mission Effectiveness through Shared Services and Interoperability,” 




13 Donald Kennedy, “Deconfliction and Officer Safety: RISSafe Reaches Program Milestone,” ISE 




confrontations, injuries or death.15  There was also no further elaboration to the level of 
the conflict and whether it related to direct event deconfliction or case/target 
deconfliction. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What framework would provide accountability and oversight for federal law 
enforcement event and case/target deconfliction efforts? 
The framework discussed in this thesis will concentrate on federal criminal 
investigations in order to scope the deconfliction issue. Any recommendation(s) could 
then be further evaluated for application throughout the entire national population of 
sworn law enforcement officers (federal, state, local and tribal). These circumstances are 
not unique to federal law enforcement, but in order to scope the assessment on event and 
case/target deconfliction, federal law enforcement agencies will be the main focus of this 
thesis. When two or more federal law enforcement agencies within the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) or the Department of Justice (DOJ) investigate criminal 
organizations, there is a risk of duplication of effort and/or concerns relating to officer 
safety. Since the majority of federal criminal investigators are employed by the 
Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security, these two departments 
will be the precise focus of any recommendations. If existing deconfliction processes are 
sufficient, what oversight and reporting is necessary if agencies fail to deconflict and 
police-on-police encounters occur?  
To date, no agency or entity has direct (or indirect) oversight of failed 
deconfliction efforts. Without a national repository for failed deconfliction events, there 
is no measurement available to determine how many and at what level of seriousness 
police-on-police encounters have occurred. These data and the specific scenarios are 
necessary to provide lessons learned in order to address vulnerabilities.  There is also no 
mechanism to capture fiscal waste and inefficiencies when two or more federal criminal 
investigations are developing without knowledge of partner agencies. Federal criminal 
                                                 
15 Ibid. 
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investigative agencies do not currently have any formal mechanism, requirement, and/or 
incentive to document police-on-police confrontations.  
The framework of participation in the deconfliction process involves many 
interconnected issues. Multiple questions were asked. Are the established deconfliction 
systems interoperable? What motivates compliance or hampers participation? Are there 
cyber security concerns relating to the provided data? What role does congressional 
funding play with agency performance measures?  How can the organizational structure 
of federal criminal investigative agencies challenge the deconfliction process?  With the 
lack of any national repository of failed deconfliction, it is not clear how pervasive the 
lack of accountability and oversight is.  
In a May 2007, the U.S. Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) report on 
violent crime task forces, it was documented that federal law enforcement agencies are 
not participating in deconfliction efforts. While the literature is not abundant on this 
specific issue, lack of coordination and lack of information sharing are common themes. 
This same GAO report also identified agencies’ concerns about providing investigative 
information to deconfliction entities as a factor in why officers and departments are 
reluctant to disclose complete details of their investigation during requests for 
deconfliction.16 
E. METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSIS 
Gap analysis of current policies regarding federal law enforcement deconfliction 
were conducted to uncover formal and informal processes occurring within the federal 
law enforcement community, to determine whether there is sufficient framework to 
provide oversight on deconfliction efforts. Through this analysis, key gaps and/or lapses 
in the framework were identified. After evaluation of the findings, this thesis made 
recommendations that could be implemented in order to provide greater degrees of 
deconfliction oversight. 
                                                 
16 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Evaluation and Inspections Division, 
Coordination of Investigations by Department of Justice Violent Crime Task Forces: Results of Review 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, May 2007), 
www.justice.gov/oig/reports/plus/e0704/results.htm. 
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The U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) identifies the position of a 
Grade Series 1811 as a criminal investigation series that requires the ability to plan and 
execute federal criminal investigative operations. The focus group of this thesis will be 
the DOJ and the DHS GS 1811 grade series criminal investigators/special agents, as these 
two departments employ the majority of federal criminal investigators/special agents. As 
previously stated, deconfliction is not limited to federal agents and for the purpose of this 
analysis, the deconfliction activity of only federal criminal investigative agencies will 
represent any initial recommendations.   
1. Data Sources 
In an effort to understand the intricacies of the current deconfliction processes, an 
examination of existing literature occurred. Individuals involved in the deconfliction 
environment were expected to provide suggestions relating to additional literature not 
previously available regarding policies and/or objectives of deconfliction.   
In addition to a scholarly review, the author’s personal experience with a federal 
civil law enforcement agency will be analyzed. Based on nearly 27 years of service as a 
federal criminal investigator, including career promotions since 1999 to positions of 
senior management, the author will provide insight that may not be found in literature. 
The author will use her own knowledge and experience in an effort to address key issues. 
2. Type and Mode of Analysis  
Gap analysis was the preferred method of analysis. After the data collection was 
completed, themes were identified and evaluated. Additional analysis was conducted 
when new information was learned that was not previously identified through the 
literature review. These newly identified issues or revelations were then analyzed in order 
to understand their connection, if any, to the research focus. Conscious effort was made 
to understand the interconnectivity of this complex issue so that any possible 
alternatives/recommendations did not then provide unintended consequences or 
cascading effects. In cases where successful efforts to deconflict exist, any 
recommendations will attempt to protect those existing smart practices. Any gaps and/or 
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lapses that highlight the vulnerabilities within the deconfliction processes were identified 
and additional evidence sought to provide clarity. 
As the analysis developed, budgetary issues were considered and whether they 
would impact the implementation of a final recommendation. A comprehensive review of 
any known applicable laws and/or regulations was conducted in order to provide 
additional clarity in understanding the collected data. A review of existing reports and 
analysis on deconfliction efforts, along with available federal agency deconfliction 
protocols, uncovered the lack of a national repository for deconfliction efforts whether 
positive or negative.   
3. Solution 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. HISTORY POLICE LINE OF DUTY DEATHS 
As of 2009, there were approximately 706,886 full-time sworn police officers in 
the United States.17  In 2008, the United States federal government had 73 agencies with 
a cadre of approximately 120,000 sworn law enforcement officers.18  Of those 73 
agencies, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agencies Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) ranked first and 
fourth respectively with a combined 49,309 sworn law enforcement officers.19 
The National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund (NLEOMF) maintains 
records of officers who classify as line of duty deaths (LODD). According to NLEOMF, 
697 law enforcement officers have lost their lives by gunfire (January 1, 2000 to 
November 18, 2012).20  This number includes all deaths by gunfire, which means these 
697 officers may have died due to actions of a criminal offender, an unintentional 
discharge, or handling of their weapon, a training, or gun range accident, a stray round of 
fire during a gunfight, or by accident when misidentified as a perpetrator.  
The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Uniform Crime Report (UCR) of 
2010 reports that 33 law enforcement officers were accidently killed by firearms for the 
                                                 
17 “Full-Time Law Enforcement Employees, Table 74—Crime in the United States 2009.” U.S. 
Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed March 24, 2014. 
http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/data/table_74.html. 
18 “Federal Law Enforcement Officers, 2008,” Bureau of Justice Statistics, accessed March 9, 2013, 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fleo08.pdf. 
19 Ibid. 





period of 2001–2010.21  Twenty-one of those deaths were related to crossfire, mistaken 
for subject, or firearm mishap.22   
Another location with a repository of data for officers killed in the line of duty is 
the website “Officer Down Memorial Page.”  In addition to having specific search criteria 
for accidental gunfire, this website provides electronic links to each killed officer’s 
incident details. After reviewing the incident details of each of the 45 cases of death by 
accidental gunfire for the period of 2000–2012, 17 officers died when they were 
misidentified as a perpetrator.23  It appears that at least two of these officers were 
involved in undercover activities when other officers believing they were criminals 
intentionally shot them.24   
These statistics do not provide for nonfatal incidents where the officer was injured 
by a fellow officer. They also do not provide for incidences where officers encountered 
each other and the situation was deescalated to avoid the use of deadly force. This 
information needs to be collected in order to scope the severity of deconfliction issues 
Robert O’Brien wrote in the Police Magazine online SWAT blog, “All line-of-
duty deaths are tragic, but perhaps the most devastating type of all LODDs is from 
‘friendly fire.’  Simply put, blue-on-blue deaths should never happen. Yet, statistics show 
an average of two officers die at the hands of other officers in blue-on-blue engagements 
each and every year.”25 
                                                 
21 U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigations, “Law Enforcement Officers 
Accidently Killed 2001–2010,” accessed November 18, 2012, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/cjis/ucr/leoka/leoka-2010/tables/table61-leok-accidentally-circumstance-01-10.xls. 
22 Ibid. 
23 “Find a Fallen Officer,” Officer Down Memorial Page, accessed November 18, 2012,  
http://www.odmp.org/search. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Blue-on-Blue is a term used to explain enforcement activities where police-on-police encounters 
occur; Robert O’Brien, “Friendly Fire: A Devastating LODD,” SWAT Blog, April 26, 2011, 
http://www.policemag.com/blog/swat/story/2011/04/blue-on-blue-shootings-and-swat-part-one.aspx. 
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B. ISSUES AND REPORTS 
1. New York State Task Force on Police-on-Police Shootings 
In 2009, New York State commissioned an investigative task force to complete a 
comprehensive report on police-on-police shootings and appears to be the first 
independent and comprehensive inquiry into this issue. The report was not limited to 
New York, but focused on the issue nationally and concentrated on mistaken-identity, 
police-on-police shootings. The New York State Task Force Report on Police-on-Police 
Shootings defined police-on-police mistaken-identity shootings as: 
One in which a police officer fires on another police officer or law 
enforcement agent in the mistaken belief that the subject officer is a 
criminal and poses an imminent physical threat. The shooting officer in a 
mistaken-identity incident is purposefully and intentionally choosing to 
fire on a subject officer. This is distinguished from a crossfire incident, in 
which another officer utilizing an imperfect target choice during a combat 
situation shoots an officer. Mistaken-identity incidents that do not result in 
gunfire are termed “confrontation situations,” in which one officer—the 
“challenging officer”—identifies himself as an officer (optimally using the 
phrase “police, don’t move”) and confronts an unidentified officer—the 
“confronted officer”—who is usually attired in civilian clothes.26 
The national data compiled by this New York State commissioned task force 
since 1981 identified 26 police officers who lost their lives across the United States, 
having been shot and killed by another officer in blue-on-blue engagements. Six of these 
officers were killed while in an undercover capacity and eight were plainclothes.27  
Five trends were noted in this New York State Task Force report as it relates to 
mistaken-identity, police-on-police shootings: 
 
 Trend 1: Fatal, mistaken-identity, police-on-police shootings have 
occurred at a slow but steady pace over the past 30 years. 
                                                 
26 Wilbur Chapman, “Statement of New York City Police Department Deputy Commissioner, 
Training,” statement before the Police-on-Police Shooting Task Force, accessed November 20, 2012, 
http://www.policeonpolicetf.ny.gov/assets/documents/Chapman%20Testimony.pdf. 
27 New York State Task Force, Reducing Inherent Danger: Report of the Task Force on Police-on-




 Trend 2: For the current generation of police officers and residents of 
New York State, fatal, mistaken-identity shootings are a new phenomenon 
in the last few years. 
 Trend 3: These shootings occur in all parts of the country and in police 
departments of all sizes. 
 Trend 4: Officers of color were more frequently the victims in fatal, 
mistaken-identity, police-on-police shootings in the second half of our 30 
year-study period than they were in the first half. 
 Trend 5: Almost all of the officers of color killed in these incidents were 
taking police action while off duty at the time they were killed (9 out of 
12), whereas almost none of the white officers were off duty at the time (1 
of 13).28  
Although the New York State Task Force report noted, and was duly concerned 
about, the statistical racial disparity noted in trends 4 and 5, this thesis concentrated on 
the necessary framework needed for all law enforcement deconfliction. 
In December 2009, New York Police Department (NYPD) Deputy Commissioner 
of Training Wilbur Chapman provided a statement to the governor of New York. Deputy 
Commissioner Chapman noted that 10 NYPD officers had lost their lives in mistaken-
identity shootings since 1930.29  In his testimony, Chapman stated, “no patterns were 
discerned from this small statistical sample.”30  However, one notable finding was that 
80% of the officers were off duty.31  Two different surveys were conducted with more 
than 200 undercover and plainclothes officers.32 The survey also found that 12% 
experienced police-on-police encounters, sub-surveys identified 83% were off duty, 
followed by 50% undercover and 42% plainclothes.33  The report noted that the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) also attempted to gain data on 
                                                 
28 Ibid., 18–21. 
29 Chapman, “Statement of New York City Police,” 3. 
30 Ibid., 1.   
31 Ibid., 4. 
32 Ibid., 1–2. 





mistaken-identity incidents and found that there was “no national data repository” 
regarding this subject.34 
These findings support the fact that there are no known statistics for the number 
of officers killed, injured, or confronted in the line of duty relating to event or case/target 
deconfliction. As noted, the closest estimate of this type of situation is found in the 
accidental gunfire statistics, which do not differentiate between several types of 
accidental gunfire. The accidental gunfire statistics do not provide sub-sets of statistics 
for mistaken-identity deaths, injuries, or confrontations. Nowhere are there statistics on 
the number of investigative operations where the absence of investigative deconfliction 
led to police-on-police mistaken identity deaths, injuries, or confrontations. As 
comprehensive as the New York State Task Force report was, it did not address the 
specific law enforcement coordination and investigatory deconfliction element.  
C. VARIABLES AND COMPLIANCE 
1. Government Reporting 
A July 2011, Government Accountability Office  report assessed whether the 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Drug Enforcement Administration had 
fully implemented the 2009 agreement provisions relating to the deconfliction 
requirement. They found that “the manner of deconflicting in advance of enforcement 
operations is left up to the discretion of local SACs,” (sic. Special Agents in Charge). 
DEA and ICE field offices are to invite their counterpart to participate in their 
investigations and task forces.”35  
Research of deconfliction systems identified several initiatives, agencies, or 
organizations touting their deconfliction elements within their services. Some of these are 
the Department of Justice (DOJ)—Bureau of Justice Affairs—Regional Information 
Sharing Systems (RISS), DEA El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), DEA Special 
                                                 
34 Chapman, “Statement of New York City Police Department,” 3. 
35 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Combatting Illicit Drugs: DEA and ICE Interagency 
Agreement Has Helped to Ensure Better Coordination of Drug Investigations, GAO-11-763. (Washington, 
DC: Government Printing Office, July 2011), 23. 
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Operations Division (SOD), Deconfliction Internet Connectivity Endeavor (DICE),  DEA 
High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA), FBI Guardian, state and local 
fusion/intelligence centers, Secure Automated Fast Event Tracking Network 
(SAFETNet), Omega Group (crime mapping),  biometric identification, local informal ad 
hoc processes and non-compliance with any system. 
 
Figure 1.  GAO Findings of Deconfliction Systems Used by State36  
The illustration in Figure 1 indicates deconfliction use by state as of April 2013. 
In addition to identifying use of systems, the GAO report provided two examples of 
failed deconfliction. In one case, an undercover officer was shot and killed, and the other 
                                                 
36 U.S. Government Accountability, Information Sharing: Agencies Could Better Coordinate to 
Reduce Overlap in Field-Based Activities (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, April 2013), 30. 
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case involved a situation where two undercover officers pulled guns on each other 
believing the other was a drug dealer.37  
Some of these deconfliction processes require a person to complete the queries. 
Not all mechanisms to deconflict are available 24 hours a day, which is inherently 
problematic as police agencies do not close. Agency deconfliction can range from word 
of mouth/peer-to-peer to online secure Internet based reporting. HIDTA nationally 
coordinated deconfliction efforts for 949 local, 172 state and 35 federal law enforcement 
agencies, and 86 other participating organizations.38  
A GAO July 2011 report stated that DEA and ICE developed and implemented 
local deconfliction protocols and used a variety of mechanisms to deconflict counter 
narcotics’ investigations.39  As previously noted, DEA has DICE, and EPIC, along with 
the established HIDTA systems. ICE/HSI uses HIDTAs, but then deconflicts with all 
other known entities to provide additional confidence that all avenues to deconflict have 
been exhausted.  
A May 2007 Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report found the following 
relating to law enforcement coordination and deconfliction efforts: 
The Department [of Justice] does not require the components to coordinate 
task force operations, cooperate on investigations, or deconflict law 
enforcement events.”  “ATF, DEA, and USMS headquarters’ managers 
entered into Memorandums of Understanding that require their task forces 
to coordinate their operations. In contrast, the FBI’s policy does not 
address FBI coordination with new task forces created by the other 
Department components…40  
The nationwide arrest data showed that the task forces duplicated one 
another’s efforts more often than they cooperated in joint investigations.41 
                                                 
37 Ibid., 29. 
38 Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Control Strategy: The High Intensity Drug 
Trafficking Area Program (Washington, DC:  Executive Office of the President, 2001), 2.  
https://www.ncjrs.gov/ondcppubs/publications/enforce/hidta2001/index.html. 
39 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Combatting Illicit Drugs, 23. 
40 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Coordination of Investigations. 
41 Ibid. 
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The ATF Special Agent in Charge admitted that there was potential for 
their investigations to duplicate one another.42 
An FBI Supervisory Special Agent stated, “I am truly concerned that we 
are seriously going to be duplicating [each other’s investigations of] 
gangs.43 
One FBI official stated how do we coordinate with federal agencies that 
have specific jurisdictions when we have jurisdiction for all of this 
[violent crime]?” “We aren’t going to give up a case.”  “We’ll let other 
agencies know [the FBI’s plans].”44 
Not only did this OIG report discover a lack of coordination and deconfliction, it 
identified a practice of duplicative arrest reporting nationwide.45  They found during 
fiscal year (FY) 2003–2005 nationwide task forces reported 97,228 arrests.46  Arrests 
were claimed by more than one task force in 1,288 cases.47  The report was not able to 
determine the reporting of the remainder of the arrests. When the inspectors reviewed 
case investigations, they found that task force “components were increasingly duplicating 
effort.”48  They found that there was a 167% increase in duplicative investigations for the 
period of FY 2003–FY 2005.49 
Relating to deconfliction efforts, the report added that another “critical factor in 
event deconfliction was task force compliance with policies mandating the use of a 
deconfliction system for every event.”50  Three police-on-police deconfliction failures 
were documented in this report. In one case, two agencies encountered each other doing 
surveillance of a criminal target. Another case involved an undercover gun purchase, in 
which an Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) agent was arrested in error. 
                                                 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 








The third example also involved weapons. ATF arrested an individual who turned out to 
be an FBI informant. No explanation was ever given by the FBI for why they did not 
deconflict their undercover operation.51 
Some reasons were provided to the OIG inspectors for failing to deconflict. An 
FBI special agent would not deconflict with his local police department (Chicago Police). 
He told the OIG inspectors “if he told the Chicago Police Department that he was “hitting 
the place,” the investigation would be stolen.”52 Another explanation was each 
department in a task force thought the other deconflicted. The report concluded by stating 
that the only agency having a policy that mandated their actions be deconflicted was 
DEA. They are required to use the HIDTA deconfliction system.53 
Several recommendations were made by the New York State Task Force report on 
police-on-police shootings. Two recommendations involved the request for the 
Department of Justice to develop national protocols for police-on-police confrontations 
and strengthen national reporting on police-on-police confrontations.54  
There is also recognition that there are many police-on-police confrontations that 
do not escalate to any use of force.55  These encounters are also not documented in a 
formal system. 
The findings of these government reports reveal that in some cases the level of 
deconfliction is left up to the discretion of senior managers who are encouraged, but not 
mandated to invite their counterparts to participate in investigations. In addition to 
informal standards, there was also data that supports the fact that duplicative 
investigatory efforts occur between agencies. It is concerning that is was noted that some 
did not deconflict because they thought the other agency was going to do it.   
                                                 
51 Ibid. 
52 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Coordination of Investigations. 
53 Ibid. 
54 New York State Task Force, Reducing Inherent Danger, 90–91. 
55 Spawn, “Officer Safety during Police-on-Police Encounters.” 
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2. Deconfliction Use during Operation “Fast and Furious” 
Operation Fast and Furious involved the sale and eventual transportation of 
weapons to Mexico, which is a federal crime. In December 2010, U.S. Border Patrol 
Agent Brian Terry was killed in the line of duty by one of the suspect weapons. John 
Dodson was an agent with the ATF Phoenix office in 2009. The New York Post published 
an excerpt of Dodson’s book “The Unarmed Truth.”  Dodson writes of the “routine query 
of several federal law enforcement and phone-number databases to see if any of our 
targets had “pinged”56 any other agency’s radar.”57  
After March 2010, DEA “through their own deconfliction protocols” had 
discovered that the two suspects that ATF had identified as larger targets in their 
investigation were in fact already part of a joint investigation involving the DEA and the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).58  Dodson asserts that later he and others learned 
that these same two suspects were actually confidential informants for the FBI.59  
3. National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan, October 2013 
Discussion of the value of deconfliction was addressed in the National Criminal 
Intelligence Sharing Plan, October 2013. Specifically, it was recommended that “law 
enforcement agencies at all levels of government should participate in deconfliction using 
existing technology solutions to ensure both officer safety and increased interagency 
coordination.”60  
                                                 
56 In this context, the term pinged signifies a confirmation that agency cellular phone deconfliction 
checks are shown to be associated with other agencies investigations or targets. 




60 Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council. National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan: Building 
a National Capability for Effective Criminal Intelligence Development and the Nationwide Sharing of 
Intelligence and Information (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2013), 35. 
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4. Regional Information Sharing System 
The Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) initiated its RISSafe 
operation/event deconfliction program in the summer of 2008. This past November 2013, 
RISS announced that its 750,000th operation entered into the RISSafe.61  RISS 
announced that more than 260,600 conflicts had been identified to date, which 
represented 35% of all operations entered.62  RISS calculated those findings to report that 
seven of every 20 operations entered into RISSafe conflicted with other entries, which 
could have resulted in near confrontations, injuries or death.63  A variety of operational 
attributes can result in a notification of conflict. Some examples are:  proximity, subject 
names, aliases, phone numbers, state license plates and/or commodity.64  A commodity 
may be the contraband being purchased (i.e., 24 kilograms of heroin).   
When RISS Watch Center staff identifies conflicts in operational submissions, 
they notify the agencies impacted by the conflict. This notification is expected to ensure 
safety of officers and the public  
D. LESSONS LEARNED U.S. MILITARY ORGANIZATIONAL 
STRUCTURE 
1. Historical Perspective of United States Military Organizational 
Challenges 
An organizational synopsis of the United States military demonstrates some 
challenges and evolution that occurs when many departments or branches have 
independent operational control. It shows a glimpse of the complexity and possible policy 
challenges to having multiple jurisdictions, agencies, and departments who do not have 
any operational oversight of the each other. 
Joel Brenner writes in his work “America The Vulnerable: Inside the New Threat 
Matrix of Digital Espionage, Crime and Warfare” that  “the departments of the executive 
                                                 





branch—State, Treasury, Justice and Homeland Security, and so on—are isolated silos 
that in most circumstances are incapable of coordinated action.”65  Brenner add that  
“civilian law enforcement agencies could learn from the history of the Army and Navy 
when coordination was not working as well.66 
Brenner highlights the creation of the War Department in 1789 and the Navy 
Department in 1798 by commenting that the “two remained rigorously and jealously 
independent until after World War II.”67  Noting memoirs of Lieutenant General Ulysses 
Grant at the Battle of Vicksburg in 1863, Brenner submits: “The secretary of war was the 
civilian head of the Army, the Navy had its own secretary and each reigned supreme in 
this earthen or watery realm.”68  “As a result, joint operations in wartime were hazardous 
affairs that produced as much friction as cooperation,” Brenner said.69  
Brenner’s Chapter 10, “Managing the Mess,” highlights actions during the 
Spanish-American War and up to the attack on Pearl Harbor: 
Relations between the army and navy were so bad in Cuba during the 
Spanish-American War that “the army commander refused to turn 
captured Spanish ships over to the Navy or allow a navy representative to 
sign the surrender document.”70 “In theory, the president could command 
them both, but by the twentieth century the task of presiding over the 
government had become too complex for the president to concern himself 
with the details of government operations, civilian or military.71  
Brenner often references the works of James R. Locher III, who wrote Victory on 
the Potomac, The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon.  It was obvious that two 
different managerial systems would not afford efficient logistical coordination.72 
                                                 
65 Joel Brenner, America the Vulnerable (New York: The Penguin Press, 2011), 216. 
66 Ibid., 216. 
67 Ibid., 216–217. 
68 Ibid. 





Here are some key dates of Military Joint Organization as chronicled by 
Brenner:73 
 1947: Congress split the War Department into the Department of the 
Army and the Department of the Air Force. 
 1949: Congressional action created the Department of Defense, but 
separate military departments still existed. 
 1986: “Congress addressed military fiefdoms by passing the Goldwater-
Nichols Act. The Army, Navy, and Air Force were stripped of operational 
command authority and for the first time vested effective command 
authority in joint commands.”74  
Although great success came from the unified efforts, changing the mindset of 
those who had deep held service loyalties did not happen overnight.75  One of the 
outcomes of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was an understanding that in order to attain 
higher rank, officers would need to complete a “joint duty” tour with one of the other 
services.76  Brenner references a conversation with Admiral Mike McConnell who was 
then the director of National Intelligence. Admiral McConnell said, “When I was a young 
naval officer, if I had said I was interested in a tour with one of the other services, my 
career would have been finished.”  “After Goldwater-Nichols, I couldn’t get ahead 
without it.”77  In essence, this cross cultural knowledge immersion was the mechanism to 
expose other service members to the operations and challenges they would not experience 
in their own silo. The benefits for such cross-pollination are an important point. The 
ability to expand military leader’s experience and build on their professional networks 
across historically independent silos was a great way to break down the silos between 
services. 
                                                 
73 Ibid., 217–218. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid., 218. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid., 218–219. 
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2. Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 Hailed as Success 
U.S. General John Wickham was quoted referencing the Goldwater-Nichols Act 
of 1986, “Nine years after the act was implemented, one of its leading military opponents 
hailed it as “a major contribution to the nation’s security.”78  Brenner summarized the 
success by stating, “This act is one of the most important organizational reforms in the 
history of the United States government—as important as our technological edge in 
making our military the most powerful in the world.”  “All our military services are 
proud of it—and all of them resisted it fiercely at the time.”79  
The current organizational structure of the U.S. military establishes a way for 
independent branches to retain their identity and individual missions that still requires 
joint coordinated operations (Figure 2). Using the history and evolution of the U.S. 
military is relevant to U.S. law enforcement deconfliction efforts. Law enforcement 
federal agencies are also independent silos and do not fall under the command and 
control of other agencies. They only intersect within the Executive Branch of U.S. 
Government. Understanding the challenges of the U.S. military in building a joint 
operations mindset is important. Change did not come quickly, but the benefits of 
coordinated efforts and information sharing were clearly an outcome for the U.S. 
military.   





Figure 2.  Organization of the Department of Defense  as of March 201286  
                                                 
86 U.S. Department of Defense, “Organization of the Department of Defense,” accessed February 12, 2014, 
http://odam.defense.gov/Portals/43/Documents/Functions/Organizational Portfolios/Organizations and Functions 
Guidebook/DOD_Organization_March_2012.pdf. 
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3. U.S. Government Federal Structure in Comparison 
Brenner’s America the Vulnerable asks this question with key observations: 
a) “Why isn’t the rest of the government organized this way?”87  
b) “But it’s simply wrong to assume that the organization of the military can 
teach us nothing about the organization of our civilian departments.”  
“From an organizational point of view, the military side of our 
government is light years ahead of the civilian side in its ability to attack 
problems jointly.”  
c). “The American military’s ability to plan and execute stupendously 
complex, efficient operations anywhere on the planet is astounding.”  
“This could not occur without the seamless integration of the services in 
the field.”  
d) “Cross-departmental governance is extremely difficult-and not just in the 
United States.”  Doing it well requires an office with authority over the 
departments and the power to muscle entrenched and often parochial 
bureaucracies and we don’t have it.”  
Within the civilian law enforcement realm, operational control is effectively held 
within each Department (i.e., DOJ, DHS, and Department of State [DOS]). Departments 
work under the auspices of “coordination.”88  
Departmental Secretaries are the final authority within their departments. Their 
authority comes from law. Brenner speculates, “as a result, America’s federal 
government is run by an awkward compromise among powerful fiefdoms – much like 
military operations in World War II.”89  “This is not a viable model for governing a 
powerful nation in the twenty-first century.”90  
In reviewing the organizational chart of the United States Government, the 
complexity and layers are apparent. Thus, deconfliction efforts must bridge the diverse 
organizations and provide for comprehensive data collection. There are 15 executive 
departments. Within those departments, are various federal criminal investigatory 
                                                 
87 Brenner, America the Vulnerable, 218–220. 




agencies and agents. There are also independent establishments and government 
corporations. Within those establishments and corporations are criminal investigators 
conducting criminal investigations. These U.S. departments, establishments and agencies 
ultimately report to the president of the United States, just as the United States military 
does. Recalling the lessons-learned during the discussion of the organization of the 
United States military, the growth of this country and the inability of the president to be 
the daily coordinator for all military matters is just as visible within this organizational 
structure with the multitude of departments, establishments, and corporations (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3.  The Government of the United States Organization91  
                                                 
.91”Federal Law Enforcement Officers, 2008,” Bureau of Justice Statistics. 
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4. Federal Agencies Involved in Criminal Investigations 
In June 2012, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Office of Justice Programs 
(OJP), Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) published a bulletin titled “Federal Law 
Enforcement Officers, 2008” that identified federal agencies who employ full-time 
officers with authority to carry firearms and make arrests. The information in Table 1 
outlines the 40 federal agencies that represent 13 Departments/Branches, not including 
the Independents such as the railroad police, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) and U.S. Postal Service (USPS).92  Of the nearly 120,000 sworn full-time federal 
officers in 2008, 37.3% (approximately 45,000) of them were found to have a primary 
function of conducting criminal investigations.93 This would show the magnitude of the 
deconfliction issue and the imperative to ensure investigations are fully coordinated. 
  
                                                 
92 Ibid. 
93 “Federal Law Enforcement Officers, 2008,” Bureau of Justice Statistics. 
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Table 1.   Department and Branch of Federal Agencies Employing Full-Time Officers 
with Authority to Carry Firearms and Make Arrests by Primary Place of 
Employment, September 2008.94 
 
 
                                                 
94 Ibid. 








5. Increase in Nontraditional Agencies Involved in Criminal 
Investigations 
In December 2011, the Wall Street Journal reported on the growth of federal 
agents within agencies not immediately associated with having criminal investigations. 
These smaller agencies have approximately 25,000 sworn officers.95  In 1973, there were 
507 criminal investigators in nontraditional civilian agencies.96  By 2011, there were 
3,812 criminal investigators in this category (Figure 4).97  This represents as 750% 
                                                 




increase in nontraditional investigators. These numbers did not include units who were 
absorbed into the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) after 2002.98  This 
information is relevant to depict the increase in agencies not typically known for 
conducting criminal investigations and who would need to deconflict. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Gaining Force: Total Number of Criminal Investigators in 
Nontraditional Civilian Agencies.99  
The majority of federal agents conducting criminal investigations are employees 
of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
(Figure 5).100 A clarification is needed because not all federal agencies who employ 
sworn officers conduct criminal investigations. The United States Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM) classifies federal criminal investigators as a Series 1811.  
An example of that would be the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE). ICE contains two divisions: Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) and 
                                                 
98 “The Government’s Growing Police Force,” Wall Street Journal. 
99 Ibid. 
100 “Federal Law Enforcement Officers, 2008,” Bureau of Justice Statistics. 
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Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO). ERO conducts operations as does Customs 
and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Border Patrol (USBP), but they do not conduct 
criminal investigations. With the increase in the number of Border Patrol agents, it would 
be prudent to consider the importance of interagency (DHS) deconfliction (Figure 6).101  
In this example, these two agencies would also be a factor in operational deconfliction 
just as a police patrol division could encounter the city detective’s undercover operations.   
 
Figure 5.  Percent of Federal Officers with Arrest and Firearm Authority, by 
Department or Branch of Government, September 2008102  





Figure 6.  Growth in the Number of Full-Time U.S. Border Patrol Officers 
from 1996–2008103  
Figure 7 and Figure 8 are provided in an effort to depict the chains of command 
and organizational silos within the Department of Homeland Security and Department of 
Justice.  
The Organizational Chart of the Department of Homeland Security depicts the 
chain of command for its law enforcement components (Figure 7). The organizational 
chart of the Department of Justice depicts the chain of command for its law enforcement 
components (Figure 8).   
 
                                                 
103  Ibid. 
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Figure 7.  The U.S. Department of Homeland Security Organization104 
                                                 
104 “Organizational Chart,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, accessed February 12, 2014, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs-orgchart.pdf. 
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Figure 8.  The U.S. Department of Justice Organization105 
                                                 
105 “Department of Justice Agencies,” U.S. Department of Justice, accessed February 12, 2014. http://www.justice.gov/agencies/index-org.html. 
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There is an additional group in which deconfliction would be prudent, but 
operationally more difficult. The Office of Inspector General within their individual 
federal agencies conduct investigations involving criminal violations relating to fraud, 
waste, and/or abuse conducted by federal programs and/or employees. In 2008, there 
were 3501 full time officers/agents in 33 agencies.106  Inherently, their investigations can 
have targets who are other government employees. The operational security of those 
investigations and targets is even more sensitive. 
E. SUMMARY OF THE LITERATURE 
Through a review and analysis of the literature, there are compelling gaps in law 
enforcement deconfliction and important questions should be addressed. 
 There are approximately 706,886 sworn police officers. 
 Nearly 20,000 police officers have died in the line of duty.   
 From 2000–2012, six hundred ninety-seven (697) have lost their lives by 
gunfire (shot by offender, accidental discharge, stray round, training 
accident, and or mistaken for offender). 
 From 2001–2010, thirty-three (33) were killed accidently (crossfire, 
mishap and mistaken for offender). 
 There are approximately 120,000 federal law enforcement officers 
(FLEO) conducting criminal investigations. 
 Approximately 45,000 of FLEOs are criminal investigators/special agents. 
 How many federal agents conducting enforcement operations (undercover 
and tactical) are confronted by other law enforcement departments or 
worse are purposefully injured or killed due to mistaken identity?  
(Unknown) 
 How many innocent bystanders are injured or killed due to mistaken-
identity shootings during police-on-police encounters?  (Unknown) 
 How many criminal investigations are being provided federal funding 
when there are duplicative investigations going on within other federal law 
enforcement agencies?  (Unknown) 
 What agency has the responsibility as the national repository for 
successful or failed deconfliction efforts?  (None) 
                                                 
106 “Federal Law Enforcement Officers, 2008,” Bureau of Justice Statistics. 
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 Who is reviewing lessons learned from inefficiencies and overlap in 
federal criminal investigations involving deconfliction?  (Unknown) 
1. Additional Findings from the Literature 
 The U.S. military experienced many challenges as it matured. Their early 
organization structure did not support joint operational oversight and 
information sharing. Those same lessons apply in some degree to federal 
law enforcement agency structure as they exist today.   
 Even after the International Association of Chief of Police (IACP), the 
United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) and members of 
the New York State Task Force on police-on-police encounters supported 
recommendations for action. To date, no entity is designated to be the 
national repository for the collection of failed deconfliction efforts and/or 
mistaken-identity encounters.   
 It is clear that law enforcement deconfliction centers and systems exist. 
Some law enforcement departments utilize local informal processes. Some 
were noted to have not used any deconfliction.   
 No formal protocol, mechanism, or regulation that is universal to all law 
enforcement entities as it relates to deconfliction was found. It appears to 
be an individual agency decision/discretion on how they deconflict. This 
may also require the need to deconflict through several different systems 
or mechanisms to feel confident that an officer has exhausted all efforts. 
To date, it is unclear on whether the established deconfliction systems are 
completely interoperable. There is no national repository for deconfliction 
failures. There is no formal reporting required for failed deconfliction 
events.   
 No literature reviewed indicated any negative aspects of participation in 
event or case/target deconfliction. Actually, terms like optimizing 
information, leveraging capabilities of partners, coordination and 
cooperation initiatives, collecting/analyzing and dissemination of strategic 
intelligence are associated with deconfliction efforts. 
 The literature reveals that on more than one occasion recommendations 
have been made to strengthen interagency coordination. The GAO in April 
2013 clearly identified the issue by saying, “establishing a mechanism to 
measure coordination would hold entities accountable for working with 
other entities, and help to reduce overlap.”107  Others like ISE, clearly 
support the “interconnectivity of existing event deconfliction systems and 
developing nationwide standards for deconfliction.”108  The question is 
                                                 
107 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Information Sharing, 34.  
108 “Section 3: Optimizing Mission Effectiveness,” ISE.gov. 
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what are some of the key challenges to event and case/target 
deconfliction?  
The next chapter will discuss some obstacles to effective deconfliction 
compliance and new concepts to consider. 
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III. DECONFLICTION OBSTACLES AND CONCEPTS 
A. OBSTACLES 
1. Should We Care? 
From the literature review in Chapter II, it is apparent that are no clear statistics to 
support or defend issues relating to deconfliction among law enforcement communities. 
Until the full picture of event and case/target deconfliction efforts is known, the prudent 
choice is to stand on the side of saving lives and reducing inefficiencies through 
identification of overlapping investigations across several federal organizations.  
2. Organization Challenges 
As shown in the previous chapter, federal criminal law enforcement agencies 
within the DOJ and the DHS operate within their own silos. The successes and failures of 
the organizational design are not the focus of this thesis. The identified problem in this 
research is to work within the organizational structure to develop workable solutions to 
deconfliction challenges. As discussed in Chapter II, the U.S. military clearly had 
growing pains relating to working through their individual silos and accepting joint 
operational oversight while maintaining their specific mission and identities. 
Already conflicts of overlapping investigations involving multiple jurisdictions 
are being evaluated and settled by the United States Attorney’s Office (USAO). Assistant 
United States Attorneys (AUSA) are presented investigations and informally become 
aware of duplicative investigative efforts within different law enforcement agencies. Task 
Force Officers (TFO) within federal law enforcement agencies can also become a form of 
informal interagency deconfliction. TFOs can be familiar with investigations within their 
own departments that may conflict with federal operations in which they are 
participating. TFOs also add value by blending investigations and building organizational 
trust between departments/agencies. TFOs are valuable assets to federal agencies in that 
they provide a level of interagency partnership that bridges many organizational 
obstacles. As professional relationships and trust are developed, the benefits are visible in 
the depth of information sharing and deconfliction efforts. 
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The role of senior leaders through first line managers is essential as they reinforce 
the importance of information sharing and partnership. The U.S. military has had many 
years of joint operations to coordinate and balance activities between their Departments. 
The U.S. joint services encourage cross-pollination of their professional officers by 
assigning them to other military departments. This career officer exposure to joint service 
duties facilitates team building, education, and familiarity to the entire Department of 
Defense structure and ways of doing business.  
3. Congressional Funding and Connected Incentives 
Federal law enforcement agencies are also evaluated by several statistical and 
demonstrative measures. These measureable results are often linked to congressional 
funding for special programs and/or enforcement missions. A few examples of these 
statistical measures would be agencies’ number of indictments, arrests, convictions, and 
seizures. Demonstrative results may be positive responses of the public and/or media 
outlets from the perception of reducing crime in their area. 
Agencies are competing for an ever-smaller share of the federal criminal 
investigative funding. There is a built-in incentive for agencies to want to be the ones who 
make the arrest or seize the evidence. Not only do agencies inherently want to be successful 
with their missions, but also the individual special agents are driven to solve the big case. 
Unlike the special agents with the DHS/ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) who 
reach a journeyman pay level of Grade Series 13 (GS-13), near automatically, as time in 
grade requirements are met, agencies like DEA may still require submission of 
documentation by the special agent to attain a GS-13. How is that relevant?  If this big case 
and/or wire intercept investigation is the enforcement activity missing on your resume to 
support a promotion to GS-13, there is a connection to the success of the investigation. An 
agent may be even more driven to attempt to maintain operational control of the targets 
and/events within their investigation. This could affect an agent’s willingness to promptly 
and repetitively deconflict information in fear that they might lose ownership and/or any 
successes that the case would bring. Thereby, losing the professional accomplishment 
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needed to secure the next promotion. This is an inherent pay grade inconsistency between 
GS 1811 special agents with the DOJ and the DHS.    
4. The Role of Trust in Informational Sharing 
Government agencies could benefit greatly by reviewing Steven M.R. Covey’s 
“The 7 High-Trust Organizational Dividends” as they would relate to deconfliction 
efforts.”109 
 Increased Value 
 Accelerated Growth 
 Enhanced Innovation 
 Improved Collaboration 
 Stronger Partnering 
 Better Execution 
 Heightened Loyalty 
Instead, governmental agencies are likely far more known for “The 7 Low-Trust 
Organizational Taxes.”110 
 Redundancy: unnecessary duplication leading to overlapping structures 
and excessive layers 
 Bureaucracy: complex cumbersome rules 
 Politics: organizational politics can cause division, resulting in wasted 
time and money along with derail strategies and sabotage initiatives 
 Disengagement: cost of disengagement nears $300 billion a year where 
employees do just enough, but do not contribute their talent, creativity, 
energy or passion 
 Turnover: retention problems undermine stability and trust  
 Churn: turnover of stakeholders 
 Fraud: flat out dishonesty and deception 
Deconfliction efforts can touch many of the so-called organizational taxes 
described above. The president of the National Fusion Center Association and director of 
                                                 




the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC), Mike Sena encapsulated 
the role of trust and information sharing when he testified before the House of 
Representatives in 2012: 
Most law enforcement will tell you that the best intelligence collaboration 
and information sharing happens when relationships among agencies and 
individuals are built on trust and experience. The right policies, 
technology, processes, protocols, and funding are essential enablers of 
effective information sharing, and we’ve seen dramatic improvements in 
these areas since 9/11. But information sharing is fundamentally about 
creating, building, and sustaining RELATIONSHIPS. Legislation and 
mandates can only get us so far. When it comes to leveraging the full 
scope of the public safety community in the United States for homeland 
security purposes, a constant effort to build relationships and develop 
trusted mechanisms is how it will get done.”111 
Event deconfliction is another major area of needed focus. True 
information sharing includes both threat information and event 
deconfliction. We believe we need a single national deconfliction system. 
While there are several good examples of event deconfliction systems in 
use by different law enforcement agencies, we need to work toward 
standardization or interoperability systems.112 
Not a day goes by without conversations among partners that are serving 
to build the trust, confidence, and relationships necessary to realize true 
information sharing.113 
Trust plays a role within law enforcement deconfliction. The agent must trust that 
the information submitted to a deconfliction system is safe and not inappropriately shared 
with others without a need to know. Agents and agencies must trust that the deconfliction 
process works properly. There is also a perceived trust that other agents and agencies are 
properly deconflicting their events and case/target information in a prompt and 
sometimes reoccurring fashion. Agencies must trust that other agencies or departments 
are honoring their information sharing and Deconfliction Memorandums of 
                                                 
111 The National Preparedness Report: Assessing the State of  Preparedness: Hearing before the 
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Understanding, if they have one. DEA and ICE/HSI have an Interagency Cooperation 
Agreement that addresses deconfliction and operational coordination. In addition to the 
interagency agreement, HSI has internal memorandums enforcing compliance with 
deconfliction protocols.  
5. Legal 
There are no laws governing law enforcement deconfliction. At most, agencies 
author memorandums of understanding between each other that may address their 
deconfliction protocols. HSI has directives that address deconfliction compliance. HSI 
recommends event deconfliction using the local jurisdiction HIDTA; and case/target 
deconfliction using DICE. At this time, there does not appear to be a need for legislation 
relating to deconfliction.   
6. Technology 
Currently, established deconfliction systems appear to be effective and agencies 
are working to make them more interoperable. This thesis did not concentrate efforts on 
the security of the systems or their interoperability. But, it should be stated that no 
derogatory information relating to system security was identified. There would have to be 
many policy decisions within and between agencies and departments requiring national 
oversight to orchestrate such an endeavor. A system would need to be in place to purge 
dated information so as not to be so stale it has no value. 
As technology continues to evolve and new mechanisms become available, many 
other deconfliction elements may become available to agents and agencies. Currently, the 
National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center (NCIRC) provides an interactive map to 




Figure 9.  Interactive Map of Deconfliction Services114 
This map identifies event deconfliction systems (Case Explorer, RISSafe, and 
SAFETNet) available in each state and U.S. territory. When a state is selected from the 
drop-down menu or map, deconfliction systems and contact information for the state or 
territory are listed. The system with the greatest number of users (in a state) is listed first. 
These event deconfliction systems will soon be interoperable. As such, agencies 
should identify and use the system that best meets their needs. 115 
7. Compliance Motives 
Although this thesis is not focused on compliance or noncompliance motives as it 
relates to law enforcement deconfliction, interagency compliance is relevant. The 
literature review uncovered agents not wanting to deconflict, as there were concerns over 
other persons corrupting and/or accomplishing the arrest or seizure. There was mention 
                                                 
114 “Event Deconfliction Systems,” National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center. 
115 Ibid. 
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of the delay in initiating the case/target deconfliction until after another agency has 
already expended investigative hours and possibly fiscal expenditures. The delay may or 
may not be intentional, but the possible inefficiencies and/or overlap would still exist.  
There is also the desire to protect the confidential informant/source, solve the case, make 
the arrest and seize the contraband. There are inherently strong motives to be the 
successful agent and/or agency. The literature reviewed did not uncover any claims of 
any agent/officer intentionally not conducting deconfliction in order to do harm. Since 
deconfliction cannot occur without human interface, awareness of compliance motives is 
imperative. 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and quite possibly the Office of the 
Inspector General (OIG) could have concerns relating to dissemination of case 
information. These concerns would involve the sensitivity of their official corruption 
investigations. The Assistant United States Attorneys (AUSA) assigned to their 
corruption and or related sensitive investigations would already know the intricacies of 
the FBI and OIG investigations and be able to provide some informal deconfliction.  
B. CURRENT EFFORTS 
The National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center (NCIRC), in partnership with 
the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the National Sheriffs’ Association, the 
Major Cities Chiefs Association, the Major County Sheriffs’ Association, the National 
Fusion Center Association, the Association of State Criminal Investigative Agencies, the 
Regional Information Sharing Systems, the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas, and 
various federal partners, “all support the need to integrate systematic event deconfliction 
into agency operations.”116  This action-oriented group in 2013 issued a document titled, 
“A Call to Action:  Enhancing Officer Safety Through The Use Of Event 
deconfliction.117  This bulletin addresses key points regarding event deconfliction  
 To ensure officer safety, it is vital for all law enforcement agencies and 
personnel to participate in event deconfliction. 




 Without event deconfliction, officers may unintentionally interfere with 
another law enforcement operation or action, potentially resulting in injury 
or death to officers or a negative impact on an investigation. 
 Enhancing officer safety, reducing risk and liability, safeguarding 
community members, ensuring case integrity, disruptions to 
investigations, strengthening information sharing, connecting suspects and 
cases, and building community confidence.118 
Partnerships like this one that created this bulletin are necessary to build 
organizational trust between agencies. This was the most forward leaning effort regarding 
support of event deconfliction found during this research. Although, this effort focused 
primarily on event deconfliction and case/target deconfliction, it would also build 
community confidence and connect suspects and cases. Community confidence would be 
associated with potential cost savings from reduction of overlapping investigations. 
One disclaimer was added to the “Call To Action.”  The bulletin stated, “The use 
of event deconfliction should not replace professional protocols when deconflicting 
events with agencies in other jurisdictions.”119 
This small disclaimer punctuates another gap in the deconfliction process. Event 
deconfliction occurs traditionally in local areas. If investigations are more far reaching, 
running event deconfliction through for example, a HIDTA system, may not afford the 
agent/officers with complete confidence that he/she has no conflicts regarding his/her 
operation. This would especially be true in cases with interstate movements, as the local 
HIDTA deconfliction will only support the information within its system. In fact, 
additional queries or submissions may be needed until a complete interface with other 
federally supported deconfliction systems exists.  
 





1. Creation of the Blue Diamond Deconfliction Division 
With approximately 120,000 federal law enforcement officers housed within 73 
different agencies and departments, the chance for overlapping investigations and/or 
police-on-police encounters is possible. With approval, an agency [the author 
recommendation is that it be Department of Justice (DOJ), United States Attorney’s 
Office (USAO)] will be charged to collect data on both failed and successful 
deconfliction events. The data would be evaluated in an effort to identify patterns and 
provide recommendations to federal departments who have no operational oversight of 
the others. The only entity short of the executive branch that by design is the hub between 
agencies is the USAO. Their visibility of connected operations and investigations already 
puts them in a unique position to be an informal deconfliction system. The USAO 
prosecutors already hold the appropriate security clearances and access for investigative 
case files, source files, and grand jury documents. This division within the USAO would 
draft and work to gain acceptance of protocols for reporting events. Most of the efforts 
would be concentrated on gaining federal compliance to already established and utilized 
deconfliction systems that are the De-confliction Internet Connectivity Endeavor (DICE) 
for case/target Deconfliction and High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) for 
event Deconfliction. Both of these systems are maintained within DOJ/DEA. The goal 
would be to reduce or eliminate police-on-police encounters and reduce inefficient 
funding for duplicative enforcement efforts.   
The creation of a federally supported element within the DOJ/USAO to house the 
national repository of deconfliction efforts within federal criminal investigative agencies 
would be an initial start. As a method to describe this element, it will be referred to as the 
Blue Diamond Deconfliction Division (BD3).  Why  a blue diamond? Traditionally, law 
enforcement is associated with the color blue as firefighters are associated with the color 
red. The diamond represents being premier with clarity and strength (Figure 10).  
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Figure 10.  Blue Diamond Deconfliction Division Conceptual Metaphor120 
 
                                                 
120 Diamond image in chart is from Tiffany.com, accessed March 24, 2014,  
http://www.tiffany.com/Expertise/Diamond/Glossary.aspx. 
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The BD3 liaisons would be Assistant United States Attorneys (AUSA) who 
represent each of the 93 USAO Districts (Figure 11).   
 
Figure 11.  United States Attorney’s Offices121 
The U.S. Attorney’s Offices are the chief federal law enforcement official within 
their Districts. The BD3 concept would be introduced as a pilot in select USAO’s offices 
with a nexus to the southwest border. The selection of offices would encompass multi-
agency law enforcement areas with the added complexity of border effort. 
A milestone would be met with simply the identification of the local BD3 AUSA 
who would embrace this role as a collateral assignment. There is an expectation that the 
                                                 
121 “Find Your United States Attorney,” U.S. Department of Justice, accessed March 16,2014, 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/districts/. 
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DOJ would support travel related expenses relating to continued outreach by these BD3 
AUSAs.  
2. Organizational Structure of the BD3 
The BD3 AUSA would represent its USAO District as a conduit for reporting 
successes, fielding complaints, issues, and/or incidences of deconfliction within their 
representative areas. It is important to reemphasize that this AUSA networking is already 
occurring daily and informally between federal agencies presenting investigations for 
prosecution. The creation of the BD3 AUSA point of contact would then formalize the 
capture and oversight of deconfliction efforts within their areas. 
Each BD3 AUSA would be assigned an administrative support person to assist 
with compilation of acquired data. Any subsequent year’s funding would support the 
technological needs along with various administrative costs. This would include the 
creation of a data management system that captures existing interagency agreements 
regarding deconfliction and information sharing between federal partners. This system 
would also populate the initial national repository for deconfliction efforts for the various 
federal law enforcement agencies. An agreement with the Bureau of Justice Statistics 
(BJS) may be needed in order to comply with any additional reporting elements. An 
example of this would be the collection of data on how many police-on-police encounters 
have occurred with focus on near-confrontations and ones with injuries and/or fatalities. 
3. Funding Considerations for BD3 
As a key portion of this initial phase of the BD3 involves outreach to key 
stakeholders, the AUSAs may need to support travel expenses within their areas of 
responsibility as their respective areas may be geographically great distances from each 
other. These AUSAs would then coordinate regular meetings with senior level managers 
to establish ground floor assessments of deconfliction efforts. 
Within 18 months of creation of the BD3 concept, an initial findings report will 
be produced and submitted to the Attorney General. The purpose of this report will be to 
determine if the BD3 should be replicated throughout the United States and begin to 
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support the States Attorney Generals in compilation of this type of data. The ultimate 
goal would then be the national repository for deconfliction conflicts and the building of 
lessons learned. The responsibility for this national repository would reside with the U.S. 
Office of the Attorney General at the Department of Justice. A portion of this lessons 
learned report, if measureable, will be the cost savings to the United States Government 
for reducing duplicative spending within agencies who are targeting the same 
individual/group. 
This BD3 initiative would require the support and authority of the Department of 
Justice, specifically the Attorney General. Being that the pinnacle of any enforcement 
activity is the anticipated prosecution; the decision of the U.S. Attorney General to 
support such an initiative as the BD3 would be enough to mandate compliance and/or 
participation by federal departments in such an initiative. 
In an effort to support compliance, the U.S. Attorney General could require that 
fiscal incentives be connected to this effort. For example, if agencies fail to deconflict 
their case/target and event information, they will not receive case funding for wire 
intercepts or other cost intensive investigations.   
It is anticipated that some agencies would have concerns about some of the 
transparency that participation in various levels of deconfliction would bring. For 
example, in Chapter II of this thesis, the Federal Bureau of Investigation voiced concerns 
within a GAO report regarding compromising investigations and/or sensitivities of their 
public corruption investigations. The same could be an argument made by investigators 
with the various Office of the Inspector General. The AUSAs assigned to these types of 
investigations already know the intricacies and would work through their BD3 points of 
contact within their offices to ensure that a blue-on-blue is not going to occur relating to 
sensitive investigations.   
In order to neutralize any arguments, it would be important to stress the need for 
patience until the first 18-month’s report. This report may discover that there are near 
negligible findings relating to deconfliction issues. It may also find room for 
improvement or after action lessons learned that could be replicated elsewhere. 
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The sheer creation of a reporting element and a national repository for failed 
deconfliction efforts will force a self-evaluation by agencies of their deconfliction 
guidance and interagency memorandums of understanding. It is the intent of the BD3 
concept that if agencies are aware that another agency has a mechanism to report failed 
compliance, through synergy and collaboration they will be more cautious to avoid 
incidents all together. It is the expectation that calling attention to this issue and 
supporting it with a method of oversight and accountability will be enough to gain a high 
compliance rate. A mandatory reporting element alone could become the catalyst to 
reduce near confrontations of police, reduce fiscal inefficiencies in federal investigations, 
and most importantly save lives.   
The overall cost of an element like the BD3 would be connected to the availability 
of Assistant United States Attorneys in each of the 93 Districts to support this element as 
a collateral duty. The intent of the 18-month reporting is to identify any measureable 
results and if needed request any specific funding needs. If it is determined that there is 
substantial near confrontational events or documented complaints, then a more robust 
computer platform or program may be required.   
A snapshot of the benefits of establishing an element like the Blue Diamond 
Deconfliction Division (BD3): 
 To save lives and reduce inefficiencies, a national repository of  federal 
Deconfliction is essential 
 A national repository for law enforcement Deconfliction efforts and 
reportable actions 
 Supports Accountability 
 Provides oversight and mediation; or if needed, remediation 
 Promotes fiscal responsibility – reduce overlap of investigations  
 Incentives for participating in event and case/target Deconfliction (i.e., 
agency or department funding based on submission of data into 
agency/department protocol  Deconfliction element/entity (DICE, 
HIDTA, RISS, etc.) 
 Trust building by recommending rotation of senior management for 
temporary assignments in another departments/agencies (i.e., HSI, FBI, 
DEA, USMS and/or ATF)  
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This chapter analyzed various issues, concepts and benefits for the purpose of 
developing recommendations and solutions. The in-depth research of Chapter II  and 
Chapter III provided clarity on the current state of deconfliction, which identifies the way 
forward for an increasingly more robust response to deconfliction challenges. Chapter IV 
will address this current state and future options 
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IV. CURRENT STATE AND FUTURE OPTIONS 
A. CURRENT STATE: OPTION ONE 
If the current state were adequate, the GAO, OIG, HIDTA, NY StateTask Force, 
RISS, NCRIC, NCIRC and others would not have called for action to provide oversight 
and accountability to law enforcement deconfliction and information sharing. Federal law 
enforcement agencies could continue with voluntary compliance and self-policing their 
deconfliction compliance. The unfortunate outcome would be that agencies and 
departments would not be fully aware of possible overlaps and inefficiencies. Erring on 
the side of caution, being able to give visibility to the entire federal deconfliction process 
would provide many senior leaders with some confidence that their partners understand 
all the implications of failing to deconflict events and targets. 
GAO’s April 2013 Information Sharing report provided specific 
recommendations that included obtaining interoperable deconfliction systems and 
performance metrics related to coordination, and promoting coordination to reduce 
overlap and inefficiencies.122  As these were only recommendations, agencies were not 
required to comply.  
B. LEANING IN: OPTION TWO 
More active conversation between stakeholders would be an improvement from 
the current status quo. It is important that this implementation involve a bottom to top 
evaluation of all current efforts of federal law enforcement deconfliction. The 
Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice would co-lead this effort. 
Upon receiving the necessary input, it is important to involve the state, local, and tribal 
law enforcement partners who inevitably will be involved directly or indirectly in federal 
law enforcement operations. These entities are important in that they not only will they 
be involved in enforcement activities that occur within their communities for which they 
are responsible, but also they may have task force officers assigned to various federal 
agencies.   
                                                 
122 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Information Sharing, 46. 
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In addition, collaboration and buy-in would be beneficial from professional police 
organizations, possibly police unions, and the established deconfliction entities (i.e., 
RISS, HIDTA, DICE and others) that provide deconfliction services. It appears several of 
these entities are making efforts to be more interoperable; however, there is not a clear 
leader to national deconfliction efforts. Professional associations and other supporting 
elements would be a mechanism to promote agency and departmental compliance with all 
aspects of deconfliction. All efforts should be made to solicit support and subject matter 
experts from the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), Fraternal Order of 
Police (FOP), Federal Criminal Investigators Association (FCIA), Federal Law 
Enforcement Officers Association (FLEOA), Major City Chiefs Association (MCCA), 
narcotics, gang and related tactical law enforcement organizations. Any decisions or 
recommendations that require legislation would then require support from congressional 
elements. But, at any time, federal agencies could invoke their own directives. 
Once the federal agencies and subject matter experts develop standards, each of 
the Departments will need to agree on the manner and level of oversight to maintain 
mandatory levels of compliance. There would also need to be a mechanism to report 
near-confrontations and blue-on-blue/police-on-police events. An identified body of 
senior level departmental leaders would then internally address issues and provides 
recommendations and decisions.  
These senior-level professionals would be responsible to provide clarity on the 
reporting of police-on-police firearm related deaths and injuries through existing agency 
structures. This rigorous reporting and accountability would send the message that 
headquarters’ elements must be involved to solve local law enforcement issues. But, the 
fact that there would be reporting and accountability would be more than is being 
captured now.  
Eventually, the larger federal agencies will still need to provide outreach to smaller 
federal criminal investigative agencies in an attempt to ensure unilateral federal compliance 
with deconfliction efforts. This would all be voluntary actions. At this point, there would 
not be a mechanism for documenting police-on-police confrontations or deconfliction 
related concerns nationally. Without empowering a single overarching entity with the 
authority, there will still be a lack of ownership, oversight, and remediation. 
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C. COMPLETE COMMITMENT: OPTION THREE AND THE 
RECOMMENDATION 
After a complete assessment of the current environment surrounding federal law 
enforcement deconfliction, a framework that encourages compliance, provides 
accountability and establishes the appropriate level of oversight is needed.  
The creation of the Blue Diamond Deconfliction Division (BD3) within the 
Department of Justice, United States Attorney’s Office (USAO) represents an entry point 
for all deconfliction data collection in order to establish a national repository (see Figure 
12). The USAO and their Assistant United States Attorneys (AUSA) are uniquely 
positioned as an impartial entity that can build partnerships and bridges between 
competing federal agencies. Due to the operational structure and silos of federal law 
enforcement, the USAO is the only agency that has the power and position to enforce 
compliance with deconfliction standards. A decision from the United States Attorney 
General to support the BD3 concept would be seen as a mandate to federal agencies to 
participate in deconfliction. The sheer creation of a reporting mechanism and a national 
repository for deconfliction efforts would force individual agency into self-evaluation.   
With the identification of BD3 AUSAs within the piloted southwest border 
locations, they would be the conduit for reporting successes, fielding complaints, issues, 
and/or incidences of deconfliction. BD3 AUSAs would initially review existing 
protocols, agreements and identify established deconfliction systems in order to identify 
smart practices, gaps, and vulnerabilities. Individual federal agencies must incentivize 
deconfliction compliance by linking their financial support of their criminal 
investigations to the appropriate use of deconfliction efforts. The BD3 AUSAs would 
populate a data management system that would have DOJ oversight. With the initial 
pilot, the expectation is that this role would be a collateral duty for the BD3 AUSA. With 
the requirement to provide a summary report within 18 months, the value of the 
interagency forum and national repository would be revealed. Any lessons learned and 
identified issues will then be evaluated in an effort to determine the future viability of the 
BD3 concept.  
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This thesis focused on the scope and breadth of federal law enforcement 
deconfliction processes within the United States. An examination of the various 
contributors to effective deconfliction processes uncovered complex organizational issues 
along with the human factors that lead to incomplete and inconsistent reporting of both 
failed and successful deconfliction events. With national oversight and accountability, 
various gaps and vulnerabilities in deconfliction operations would be addressed. The 
findings of this thesis will be surprising to some; however, from the research and analysis 
conducted, it is shown that there is a significant absence of specific information and 
statistics relating to law enforcement deconfliction efforts. One statistic stands out and is 
alarming:  An average of two officers die every year at the hands of another police officer 
during blue on blue confrontations.123  The only acceptable number is zero. Some 
anecdotal stories from peers are more specific with respect to actual numbers, but none of 
these deconfliction events is formally recorded in a national repository. The thesis 
research demonstrates that there are overlaps in law enforcement efforts, and yet at the 
same time, there are significant and dangerous gaps relating to law enforcement officer 
safety. It is vital that law enforcement agencies deconflict investigative actions. 
While different agencies pursue their legal jurisdictions against different threat 
elements within the same criminal organization, a problem arises when two or more 
agencies target the exact same individual or commodity without the other agencies being 
aware. This is an example of the overlap of coverage that occurs when deconfliction is 
not pursued appropriately. In addition and not insignificant, are the federal dollars 
expended (i.e., salaries and investigative costs) that can be identified as duplicative in 
effort; while at the same time agencies and departments are competing for limited 
congressional dollars. In addition, there is a significant increase of federal agencies 
involved in criminal investigations that before 911 were not previously known for that 
                                                 
123 O’Brien, “Friendly Fire,” SWAT Blog. 
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level and focus of enforcement. The foregoing then adds to the potential volume of 
overlapping investigations requiring deconfliction.   
While there are sufficient deconfliction systems, the challenge remains with 
interoperability. Clearly, there are organizational silos, as within the Department of 
Justice and the Department of Homeland Security, as each agency does not have 
operational control or oversight of one another. This thesis shows an important fact: The 
only location where DHS and DOJ intersect is at the United States Attorney’s Office that 
prosecutes their investigations. Within the United States federal law enforcement 
agencies, they have established policies, protocols, and interagency agreements regarding 
information sharing to include deconfliction efforts between agencies. For this reason, 
this thesis recommends that the USAO be the central organization to provide oversight 
and accountability for federal deconfliction.  
What the thesis also demonstrates is that there is no national repository or single 
entity with the task and responsibility to provide oversight and promote accountability of 
the federal deconfliction process. Is this important to law enforcement operations and 
officer safety? Absolutely. Establishing one entity to oversee and promote event and 
case/target deconfliction will provide extensive visibility for what has been previously 
unknown or only known through dispersed and random anecdotal stories between law 
enforcement officers. The Blue Diamond Deconfliction Division (BD3) would provide 
the essential an appropriate level of oversight for federal law enforcement event and 
case/target processes. 
While an expected outcome of BD3 oversight and accountability would be 
reductions in overlapping coverage, decreases in gaps of coverage and improved fiscal 
management of criminal investigations, the goal of this research is to reduce or eliminate 
police-on-police encounters. This will avoid near confrontations, injuries or worse, losses 





Highlights of a reform in deconfliction that this thesis identifies are:   
1. Fiscal Responsibility 
With oversight and accountability, there would be an effort to identify 
redundancies and/or overlap. With the establishment of the BD3, Assistant United States 
Attorneys would have increased visibility of duplicative and redundant efforts, thereby 
reducing fiscal waste. At present time, there is no visibility to better understand whether 
fiscal savings would occur.   
2. There Is Consensus  
No federal law enforcement agency, entity or report has opposed a national 
repository or the value of deconfliction and information sharing. There is consensus that 
better oversight and accountability is needed. Currently, no federal agency or department 
has assumed ownership as the national repository for law enforcement deconfliction and 
this thesis finds that there must be a national repository.  
3. Lead Change and Guide Efforts  
The next steps would be the appointment of an executive agency to lead change 
and guide the efforts which would hold all agencies and departments accountable. This 
greater degree of oversight would eliminate deconfliction noncompliance, establish 
national protocols and strengthen reporting. The BD3 would be the conduit for reporting 
successes, failures, complaints and issues involving incidences of deconfliction. Lessons 
learned from the BD3 would be used to develop nationwide deconfliction standards and 
solutions. The U.S. Department of Justice, United States Attorney’s Office (USAO) holds 
this unique position to accept the responsibility and become the catalyst to connect 
agency cases and reduce the number of existing agency deconfliction processes.  
4. National Repository  
Federal law enforcement agencies are tethered to prosecutorial efforts of the 
United States Attorney’s Office. Undoubtedly, they are the correct location for an entity 
like the Blue Diamond Deconfliction Division (BD3). A national repository is required to 
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archive both failed and successful deconfliction efforts must be established in order to 
provide oversight and accountability of law enforcement activities occurring daily around 
the country. Data collection remains absent on both the successes and failures of 
deconfliction. Both are needed to show the importance. The BD3 would accomplish this 
goal. 
5. Strengthen Information Sharing through Trust Building Practices 
The BD3 would build partnerships by initiating dialogue regarding deconfliction. 
Uniquely balancing individual agency allegiances with the obvious benefits of joint 
coordination and information sharing can be accomplished with the BD3. The greatest 
ingredient to strengthen information sharing and meaningful exchanges is to work 
diligently to build that trust through experiences. Bringing all federal investigative 
agencies to the table at the United States Attorney Offices in their respective Districts is a 
meaningful step in building and sustaining those relationships. The BD3 would be this 
framework. 
In conclusion, the imperative steps to a National Deconfliction Framework that 
this thesis defines are: 
1. To identify redundancies and/overlap in federal law enforcement 
investigations through oversight and accountability of their deconfliction 
practices 
2. To strengthen information sharing through trust building practices  
3. To fully develop the United States Attorney’s Office informal 
deconfliction role by establishing a BD3 concept within their Districts. 
Law enforcement officers protect those they serve. All efforts must be made to 
protect them. Law enforcement officers must be better protected from deconfliction 
failures and this thesis outlines the first steps to a plan of action. 
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